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NON-TECH NICAL SUMMARY  
Couples around the world spend a substantial amount of time on routine household chores that result in 
such important products as family meals, clean clothes, and comfortable living spaces. The burden of 
producing these goods around the world, and in Australia, has fallen disproportionately on women. 
However, most of the material objectives of housework can in principle be produced by anyone, regardless 
of gender; skill requirements are limited. Assuming that no one enjoys doing housework, the observed 
division of household labour is often portrayed by social scientists either as the result of a negotiation 
between the partners such that the more powerful partner is allocated less housework or as a function of 
gender role attitudes. Prior work using proxies for power and attitudes suggests that both of these 
explanations play a role.   
Our contribution in this paper exploits rich longitudinal data from the Household, Income and Labour 
Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey that allow us to examine not how the time allocated to routine 
housework differs across couples, but how couples change their time allocation from year to year. We 
model these within-couple differences as a function of differences over time in household characteristics 
(including the number and ages of children; marital status; and the age, education, and disability status of 
each partner), residential characteristics, and survey year. Controlling for these factors, we focus on how 
couples’ housework time allocations respond to major labor market events – in particular job promotions 
and terminations –  which potentially alter the relative balance of economic power within the household, 
while also influencing household heads’ time availability. The more (less) time an individual (partner) spends 
in paid employment, the less time he/she spends on housework, but there is also evidence that following a 
promotion, women report less time on housework and their partner reports more, indicating that gender 
power relations also play a role. The effect of promotions may actually be understated as we also find 
evidence that dual earner households are more likely to outsource household production to the market – by 
hiring maids and purchasing meals.   
Power dynamics cannot, however, explain all the results. Further results indicate that households holding 
more liberal gender role attitudes are more likely to adjust their housework time allocations after female 
promotion events. Supporting the sociological theory that partners may ‘do gender’, we also find that in 
households with more traditional gender role attitudes, his housework time falls while hers rises when he is 
terminated.   
These results suggest that female advancement in the formal labour market can go partway towards 
creating a more equal division of labour in the home, although the impact is modest and concentrated in 
more highly-educated households. Policy makers interested in promoting a more equal distribution of 
labour within the household may want to support programs that imply or support more gender-neutral 
behavioural norms in regard to unpaid labour, perhaps coupled with implicit or explicit targeting of less-
educated population subgroups.   
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Abstract 
The time allocated to household chores is substantial, with the burden falling 
disproportionately upon women. Further, social norms about how much work men and 
women should contribute in the home are likely to influence couples’ housework allocation 
decisions and evaluations of their lot. Using Australian data, we employ a two-stage 
estimation procedure to examine how deviations from housework norms relate to couples’  
satisfaction. In stage one, we model housework time to identify predicted (i.e., socially 
expected) and residual components. In support of this bifurcation, the residual housework 
time measures are strongly related to each partner’s perceived fairness of the division of 
household tasks. In stage two, we predict satisfaction based on predicted and residual 
housework time. We find that women’s satisfaction, but not men’s, is robustly affected by 
their partners’ residual housework time. When he exceeds housework norms, she is happier 
with housework allocations, but less happy in broader dimensions. 
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Introduction 
“I generally find that comparison is the fast track to unhappiness.” – Jack Canfield 
People cannot help but compare their behaviors to the prevailing norms in their society. The results 
of social comparison have been conjectured to drive dimensions of psychological welfare, and 
ultimately to motivate economic behaviors including investment, search, and resource allocation 
(see Basit Zafar 2011 for a review). Social comparison effects have been seen in data from around 
the world (America, Europe, and Asia) in an array of prior studies in economics and social psychology 
(e.g., Leon Festinger 1954; Heather Smith, Thomas Pettigrew, Gina Pippin, and Silvana Bialosiewicz 
2012; Gerben van Kleef, Florian Wanders, Eftychia Stamkou, and Astrid C. Homan 2015), and with 
respect to outcomes ranging from pro-social behavior (Bruno Frey and Stephan Meier 2004) to 
personal identity (Marilynn Brewer 1991) to satisfaction (Nynke Frieswijk, Bram P. Buunk, Nardi 
Steverink and Joris P. J. Slaets 2004; Abraham Buunk, Hinke Groothof, and Frans Siero 2007).  
The social norms that form the basis of behavioral comparisons may be drawn from society “as a 
whole” (whether globally, as represented in the media, within a particular country or sub-group, or 
otherwise), and/or from groups closer at hand and known personally, such as close family members. 
In particular, behavioral norms are unavoidably established over time within households. One 
behavioral dimension of a household’s circumstances that substantially impacts everyday life, and 
where significant variation across households exists, is the intra-household distribution of time spent 
on unpaid housework. Is this a dimension along which individuals might compare themselves, or 
their family members, to social norms (whether sourced from the broader society or from the 
household’s own history)? If so, might satisfaction or welfare effects arise from such comparisons?  
We approach this question by examining the relationship between individuals’ satisfaction and the 
time they and their partners spend doing housework. In particular, we bifurcate the actual time 
spent on housework for male and female members of a household couple into predicted and 
residual housework time. We then separately test the associations of the predicted and residual 
portions of both his and her housework time with an array of measures of individual satisfaction. 
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The logic behind this approach is that the predicted portion of housework time should proxy for 
social norms about how much housework time is appropriate for oneself and for one’s spouse, and 
that individuals’ mental comparison of actual behavior to those norms may in turn drive satisfaction. 
Our approach is motivated in part by existing evidence from the sociology literature (Janeen Baxter 
2000; Mikael Nordenmark and Charlott Nyman 2003; Caroline Henchoz and Boris Wernli 2013; 
Marisa Young, Jean Wallace, and Alicia Polochek 2015; Daniel Carlson, Sarah Hanson, and Andrea 
Fitzroy 2016) relying on data from Australia, Canada, the US, Switzerland, and Sweden indicating 
broadly that the more couples share domestic labor, the happier they are.1 While these results are 
intriguing, the level of “sharing” against which partners’ judge each other’s allocation of time to 
housework is not immediately obvious. We argue that using a bifurcation of actual housework time 
into predictable (expected) and unpredictable portions enables us to isolate a proxy for the ambient 
social expectation of the amount of housework that “should” be done by a particular person in a 
particular setting – i.e., the benchmark level against which that person, and that person’s partner, 
may compare their actual performance. Our modelling approach allows us to examine whether 
changes in the unpredictable portion of actual housework time for men and women are in fact 
associated with changes in their partners’ stated satisfaction, measured in a variety of ways.  
Because women on average shoulder a disproportionate share of housework around the globe 
(OECD 2011), housework itself is arguably a more salient force in women’s lives than in men’s – 
driving more decisions on an everyday basis, taking up more conscious attention, and perhaps for 
these reasons creating more stress (as found in Rachel Connelly and Jean Kimmel 2015 and implied 
in Martha MacDonald, Shelley Phipps, and Lyn Lethbridge 2005). Consequently, one might expect 
that if the type of social comparison effects sketched above are present, they may be more evident 
                                                           
1 For a review of the broader literature in sociology regarding household labour – its measurement, division 
within the household, and associations with economic and psychological outcomes – see Beth Shelton and 
Daphne John (1996). 
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for women than for men, whose stress levels appear to be more responsive than women’s to 
aspects of the realm of paid work (Alison Booth and Jan Van Ours 2008). Specifically, relative to men, 
women may be more keenly aware of, and hence their satisfaction may be more responsive to, their 
spouses’ housework behavior – and even their own housework behavior.  
However, a related literature suggests that men who perform traditionally female unpaid tasks can 
suffer negative consequences in their relationships with the very females with whom they are 
sharing the burden. In the most famous recent example from this literature, Sabino Kornrich, Julie 
Brines, and Katrina Leupp (2012) find that both men and women in couples whose domestic chore 
allocation runs more strongly along traditional gender lines report higher sexual frequency than 
other couples. This implies that those with more egalitarian allocations have less sex. One 
interpretation of this finding is that women’s satisfaction in at least some dimensions may decline 
when the amount of housework performed by the man is unusually large in comparison to social 
norms – norms which themselves reflect a strong degree of female-specificity in the performance of 
housework.2 
Method 
To test these ideas empirically, we use longitudinal data on couple households in Australia from the 
HILDA survey. We begin by presenting some basic descriptive information for our sample, including 
reported housework time as well as an array of satisfaction measures. These statistics are reported 
separately by gender and we highlight the noticeable gender differences. We also describe the 
simple associations between housework time and the array of satisfaction measures, for men and 
women separately. 
We proceed to examine separately by gender how the time couples allocate to housework relates to 
satisfaction using a two-stage approach. In stage one, we model men’s and women’s housework 
                                                           
2 If, as beautifully articulated by West and Zimmerman 1987 (p. 126), “…the ‘doing’ of gender is undertaken by 
women and men whose competence as members of society is hostage to its production,” then by implication 
men who “do” more female-ness (for example, by allocating more time to housework) risk being perceived as 
being less competent members of society – even, presumably, by their partners. 
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time separately, saving measures of both the predicted and unpredicted (residual) portions of his 
and her housework time. In stage two, we use both of these components to model within-couple 
changes in satisfaction of various types, both specifically in relation to housework and more 
generally. We look primarily for evidence that a deviation from social norms by Partner A impacts 
the satisfaction of Partner B, motivated by the notion that if Partner A increases his/her contribution 
to housework time more than is the norm, Partner B may be more satisfied with the bargain she/he 
is getting in the partnership. Own effects may also arise if housework is considered unpleasant.  
We first look for evidence that the residual housework measures derived from our first-stage models 
of housework time relate in the ways we would predict to the perceived fairness of housework 
duties.  We find that when asked whether they do their fair share of work around the house, people 
of both genders who have higher first-stage residuals are more likely to report doing a greater share 
of housework. These patterns give us confidence that the residual housework measure constructed 
from our first stage is indicative of the deviation of an individual’s housework time allocation from 
what would be considered socially appropriate (“fair”).  
We then investigate how satisfaction with the way in which housework is allocated within the 
partnership responds to these residuals. We find that a woman’s satisfaction with housework 
allocation relates negatively to her own residual housework time, and positively to her spouse’s 
residual housework time. Notably, men do not demonstrate the same sensitivity. We further show 
that women’s satisfaction with their lives as a whole (and, in some specifications, with partner 
relationship) is negatively – not positively – related to their partners’ residual housework time, 
whereas no such effect is seen for men. Hence, housework time allocations do seem to matter more 
for women’s satisfaction than for men’s and, depending on the satisfaction measure used, the 
direction of the effect changes.  All standard errors are bootstrapped, where the bootstrapping 
procedure wraps around both steps in the analysis. 
Data 
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We use household-level panel data taken from the 2001-2014 waves of the Household Income and 
Labour Dynamics in Australia, or “HILDA”, survey (see Nicole Watson and Mark Wooden 2012 for 
more details). Our sample is restricted to single-family, mixed-gender couple households (married or 
cohabiting) of working age.3 Observations in which either partner fails to complete the self-
completed questionnaire on which housework time is reported, or fails to respond to a satisfaction 
question,4 are excluded,5 as are couples with only one year of data who are more likely than other 
couples to be in a very short-lived relationship, and who contribute no information in the context of 
panel analysis. We perform all analyses separately by gender. 
Time spent on housework is recorded as the response to the question, “How much time would you 
spend on housework (preparing meals, washing dishes, cleaning house, washing clothes, ironing and 
sewing) in a typical week?”6  These activities are routine tasks that every household has to complete 
in some way, and for the vast majority of households the time spent on these activities constitutes 
more than 40 percent of total reported time spent on a broader class of unpaid labor that 
                                                           
3 Persons younger than age 20, men older than age 64, women older than age 61, and 20-to-23-year-olds 
enrolled full-time in higher education are excluded.  The different age restrictions by gender approximately 
reflect the different ages at which men and women are eligible to receive pensions in Australia.   
4 Satisfaction with the division of housework is only asked beginning in 2005, and hence our sample size is 
smaller when running the second-stage models that use this measure, but we do not globally restrict the 
sample on that basis. 
5  Observations missing data on our explanatory variables are also dropped. The variables most likely to be 
missing data are non-labour income and gift income. Paid work time is missing for a small number of 
observations and is also top-coded at 80 hours for men and 65 hours for women, approximately the top decile 
in each case.   
6 This question is answered to the nearest minute in all HILDA waves except the first; in 2001, it is answered to 
the nearest hour. In our models, any difference in average measured quantity of housework caused by this 
change in granularity across reporting years is captured by our year dummies. 
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additionally includes running errands and performing outdoor labor, such as yard work.7 
Observations in which either partner fails to report housework time, or in which the couple jointly 
reports either no time or more than 70 hours (approximately the 99th percentile), are dropped. In 
about 85 percent of households in our sample, the woman contributes 50 percent or more of the 
hours devoted to housework in total by the couple. Most people, regardless of gender, report 
housework time in the range of one to twenty hours per week, with some degree of clustering at 
round figures (e.g., five hours, ten hours). The incidence of individuals replying ‘no time’ is 
sufficiently uncommon (less than 0.4 percent for women and less than 7 percent for men) to make 
nonlinear estimation unnecessary. 
Motivated by prior literature highlighting the role of spouses’ assessment of “fairness” with the 
division of housework (e.g., Michelle Frisco and Kristi Williams 2003), we begin our second-stage 
analysis with an examination of individuals’ responses to the question, “Do you think you do your 
fair share around the house?”.  Responses to this question range from “I do much more than my fair 
share” (coded 1) to “I do much less than my fair share” (coded 5). We think of this measure as 
capturing the individual’s appraisal of his or her housework performance relative to prevailing 
norms, and use it to support a similar interpretation of our first-stage residuals. We refer to this as a 
measure of “share fairness”, with lower numbers indicating that the individual is over-performing 
relative to norms and larger numbers indicating underperformance relative to norms.  
The HILDA survey includes several measures of satisfaction, one of which captures respondents’ 
sentiments regarding the allocation of housework. Satisfaction with “The way household tasks are 
divided between you and your partner” was recorded on a scale of 0 to 10 in waves 2005 to 2014 of 
the HILDA survey, with higher measures indicating greater satisfaction. We use this as our measure 
of satisfaction with respect to housework. We also examine two broader measures of satisfaction 
                                                           
7 At both the individual and household levels, hours spent on housework are positively associated with hours 
spent on these other forms of unpaid labour. 
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that are available in the HILDA:  specifically, satisfaction with the relationship with one’s partner and 
satisfaction with life overall. These other satisfaction measures are available in every wave of the 
survey.  
 
Table 1 
Sample Characteristics at the Couple Level 
     
Panel A 
Full 
Sample 
 
 Sample reporting 
Satisfaction with 
Division of HW 
     Number of Couples 5,180 
 
4,240 
 Number of Observations 31,929 
 
22,322 
 % Couple Spells with 2 Observations 18.07 
 
18.37 
 % Couple Spells with 3 Observations 13.98 
 
15.17 
 % Couple Spells with 4 Observations 15.08 
 
16.11 
 % Couple Spells with 5 Observations 7.76 
 
9.29 
 % Couple Spells with 6 Observations 6.49 
 
7.57 
 % Couple Spells with 7 Observations 6.06 
 
7.92 
 % Couple Spells with 8 Observations 5.02 
 
7.29 
 % Couple Spells with 9 Observations 4.31 
 
8.66 
 % Couple Spells with 10 Observations 4.44 
 
9.62 
 % Couple Spells with 11 Observations 4.65 
 
0.00 
 % Couple Spells with 12 Observations 4.88 
 
0.00 
 % Couple Spells with 13 Observations 4.96 
 
0.00 
 % Couple Spells with 14 Observations 4.31 
 
0.00 
 
     
     
Panel B Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
     His Average Housework Time 6.01 4.50 6.33 4.62 
His Average Paid Labor Time 39.35 15.66 39.39 15.20 
Her Average Housework Time 16.71 9.28 16.30 9.12 
Her Average Paid Labor Time 23.20 15.72 23.75 15.59 
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Table 1 presents some sample statistics both for the full sample and for the sub-sample in which our 
housework satisfaction measure is available. Panel A of Table 1 shows that there are almost 32,000 
observations on 5180 couples in the full sample, and more than 22,000 observations on 4240 
couples in the sample for which satisfaction with the division of housework is reported. While there 
are on average 6.2 observations per couple in the full sample, Panel A shows that the distribution of 
couples’ longevity in both samples is skewed towards shorter durations.  
Panel B of Table 1 shows within-couple means for housework time and paid work time, separately by 
gender. On average in our full sample, men report spending over 10.5 hours per week (64 percent) 
less time on housework than women, and about 16 hours per week (41 percent) more on paid work. 
These numbers are extremely similar for the subsample of observations with non-missing data on 
our housework satisfaction measure. As reported in another recent paper (Gigi Foster and Leslie 
Stratton 2017), summary statistics calculated from the HILDA measures of time spent on housework 
are quite similar to those calculated using data from the most recent Australian Time Use Survey, 
run by the Australian Bureau of Statistics in 2006. 
Table 2 shows the distribution of our measures of share fairness (in Panel A) and satisfaction (in 
Panel B), separately for men and women. The answer scale for the three satisfaction measures runs 
from 0 to 10, with 0 being “completely dissatisfied” and 10 being “completely satisfied”. As noted 
previously, the answer scale for share fairness runs from 1, being “I do much more than my fair 
share”, to 5, being “I do much less than my fair share”. 
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Table 2 
 Panel A:  Share Fairness Measures 
By Gender 
        
  
His 
Perception 
of Share 
Fairness 
   
Her 
Perception 
of Share  
Fairness  
I do much more than my fair share  4.78 
   
29.20  
I do a bit more than my fair share  10.05 
   
29.69  
I do my fair share  57.13 
   
36.01  
I do a bit less than my fair share  24.11 
   
4.11  
I do much less than my fair share  3.93  
  
0.98  
       
 
Number of Observations 
 
    31,929 
   
31,929  
        
        Panel B:  Satisfaction Measures 
By Gender 
        
 
Men 
 
Women 
 
Satisfied 
with the 
division of 
household 
tasks 
Satisfied 
with 
partner 
relationship 
Satisfied 
with your 
life overall 
 
Satisfied 
with the 
division of 
household 
tasks 
Satisfied 
with 
partner 
relationship 
Satisfied 
with your 
life overall 
        Completely Dissatisfied (0) 0.30 0.34 0.05 
 
1.08 0.37 0.04 
1 0.33 0.34 0.08 
 
1.45 0.63 0.05 
2 0.89 0.82 0.26 
 
3.37 1.04 0.18 
3 1.47 1.14 0.53 
 
4.85 1.50 0.33 
4 2.36 1.20 0.90 
 
5.24 1.68 0.70 
5 7.11 2.93 2.86 
 
9.29 3.85 2.85 
6 6.10 3.67 5.29 
 
8.64 4.61 4.88 
7 14.44 9.83 21.43 
 
14.84 11.09 19.09 
8 24.72 21.24 38.23 
 
18.92 20.24 36.77 
9 20.36 26.29 22.16 
 
15.29 25.67 24.39 
Completely Satisfied (10) 21.92 32.20 8.20 
 
17.05 29.33 10.73 
        Number of Observations     22,322      31,929      31,929  
 
    22,322      31,929      31,929  
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Fifty-nine percent of women, as compared with only 15 percent of men, report that they do “more 
than [their] fair share” of housework, while only 36 percent of women but 57 percent of men report 
that they do their fair share. The distribution of women’s satisfaction with the division of household 
tasks contains more density at the lower end of the scale, from 0 up to and including the value of 7, 
compared to the men’s distribution; only 51 percent of women, but 67 percent of men, report a high 
satisfaction level (8, 9, or 10) with the division of household tasks. A similar pattern, though far less 
pronounced, is also evident in the gender-specific distributions of reported satisfaction with the 
relationship with one’s partner. Hence, the raw data indicate that women in general feel they do 
more than their fair share of housework, are less satisfied with the division of household tasks, and 
are slightly less satisfied with their relationships with their partners, than men. This pattern is 
reversed, though only weakly, in the distributions of overall life satisfaction, with more women than 
men reporting a 9 or 10 on this scale.8   
Raw Correlations 
How does housework time relate to share fairness and our three measures of satisfaction?  Raw 
correlations (available upon request) indicate that share fairness is positively related to partner’s 
housework time. Own satisfaction with the division of household tasks is also positively related to 
partner’s housework time, though only significantly so for women. Apart from this, the reported 
time spent on housework by both oneself and one’s partner is negatively correlated with satisfaction 
and share fairness, for both genders.  
First stage estimates:  Housework time 
                                                           
8 Christopher Ambrey, Jennifer Ulichny, and Christopher Fleming (2017) report evidence generated using the 
same data set that the satisfaction of both Australian men and Australian women has fallen over time 
(attributing this fall to a decline in social connectedness).  We also find a decline over time for both genders in 
our broader satisfaction measures.   
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To examine these associations more thoroughly, we present in Table 3 the results of the first stage 
of our analysis, where we predict the time spent on housework by men and women separately. In all 
models we control for a range of individual-level characteristics (ethnicity, education, age/cohort); 
household structure variables (number and ages of household members); indicators for the 
presence of disabled people in the home, for partners engaged full-time in education, urbanicity 
(non-urban (base category), major city, and other urban), and type of housing (apartment (base 
category), house, or townhouse); reported non-labor income (the sum of interest, dividend, and 
royalty income) and gifts (the sum of inheritances, gifts and other irregular income) received by each 
partner; and state-of-residence by urbanicity and year dummies. In the second variant of our first-
stage models for each gender, we add controls for the paid employment status, industry, 
occupation, and employment hours of both partners, and in the third variant we exclude this 
employment information but include couple- and gender-specific fixed effects, necessarily dropping 
time-invariant household and individual-level observables. Finally, we estimate a first-stage model of 
her share of housework (her time divided by the sum of his and her time) using all the covariates 
from our baseline model.9 The results of these three alternative housework models are reported in 
Appendix A. 
 
 
 
                                                           
9 The share of household housework time supplied by women in two households may be the same (say 70 
percent) when the hours spent are quite different (say 7 hours in a household reporting 10 hours of 
housework, versus 21 hours in a household reporting 30 hours of housework). Spending 21 hours on 
housework constitutes a much greater burden than spending 7 hours on housework, which may have 
important implications for satisfaction. This is why in our baseline first-stage results we predict reported hours 
spent, rather than share. 
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Table 3  
Baseline Estimates of the Time Spent on Housework 
        
        
 
  
By Men 
 
By Women 
His Characteristics: 
     
 
Ethnicity:  Base Case = non-aboriginal Australian 
     
  
Aboriginal 1.0995     
 
-1.7133     
   
(0.6142) 
  
(1.2564) 
 
  
English Speaking Immigrant 0.3170     
 
-0.6860     
   
(0.2072) 
  
(0.3925) 
 
  
Other Immigrant 0.0513     
 
0.9749     
   
(0.2640) 
  
(0.5021) 
 
 
Education:  Base Case = 12 Years 
     
  
Post-Bachelors -0.0684     
 
0.6514     
   
(0.2870) 
  
(0.5578) 
 
  
BA/Honors -0.0398     
 
-0.3955     
   
(0.2721) 
  
(0.5018) 
 
  
Diploma 0.1834     
 
-0.3814     
   
(0.2088) 
  
(0.3754) 
 
  
Certificate III/IV -0.1222     
 
-0.6819     
   
(0.2319) 
  
(0.4428) 
 
  
11 Years -0.0237     
 
-1.0563  ** 
   
(0.2376) 
  
(0.4029) 
 
  
10 Years -0.0962     
 
-0.1550     
   
(0.3328) 
  
(0.6088) 
 
  
< 10 Years -0.3006     
 
-0.4813     
   
(0.2254) 
  
(0.3945) 
 
        
 
Age 
 
0.0825  *** 
 
0.0814  * 
   
(0.0206) 
  
(0.0362) 
 
 
Birth Cohort:  Base Case Born 1960-1970 
     
  
Born before 1960 -0.5937  * 
 
-0.4466     
   
(0.2958) 
  
(0.5330) 
 
  
Born after 1970 -0.2291     
 
0.6059     
   
(0.2973) 
  
(0.5053) 
 
        
 
Disabled 0.9265  *** 
 
-0.1530     
   
(0.2025) 
  
(0.3351) 
 
 
Enrolled Full-Time in School 0.1836     
 
0.4737     
   
(0.3633) 
  
(0.5468) 
 
 
Non-labor Income -0.0325  ** 
 
0.0327     
   
(0.0124) 
  
(0.0240) 
 
 
Gift Income -0.0019  * 
 
-0.0010     
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(0.0010) 
  
(0.0026) 
 Her Characteristics: 
     
 
Ethnicity:  Base Case = non-aboriginal Australian 
     
  
Aboriginal 0.9597     
 
0.5147     
   
(0.7112) 
  
(1.0660) 
 
  
English Speaking Immigrant 0.3032     
 
-0.6069     
   
(0.2468) 
  
(0.3999) 
 
  
Other Immigrant -0.0009     
 
0.7629     
   
(0.2591) 
  
(0.4877) 
 
 
Education:  Base Case = 12 Years 
     
  
Post-Bachelors 1.2747  *** 
 
-2.3731  *** 
   
(0.3681) 
  
(0.5968) 
 
  
BA/Honors 0.8754  *** 
 
-1.6900  *** 
   
(0.2938) 
  
(0.5020) 
 
  
Diploma 0.3294     
 
-1.0887  *** 
   
(0.2209) 
  
(0.3866) 
 
  
Certificate III/IV 0.1739     
 
-0.7831     
   
(0.2559) 
  
(0.4520) 
 
  
11 Years -0.6299  *** 
 
0.5179     
   
(0.2195) 
  
(0.4171) 
 
  
10 Years -0.4275     
 
0.4453     
   
(0.2920) 
  
(0.5375) 
 
  
< 10 Years -0.7467  *** 
 
1.2104  *** 
   
(0.2252) 
  
(0.4094) 
 
        
 
Age 
 
-0.0481  * 
 
0.1466  *** 
   
(0.0211) 
  
(0.0378) 
 
 
Birth Cohort:  Base Case Born 1960-1970 
     
  
Born before 1960 0.1884     
 
0.0843     
   
(0.3051) 
  
(0.5397) 
 
  
Born after 1970 0.0225     
 
0.2865     
   
(0.2979) 
  
(0.5059) 
 
        
 
Disabled 0.8198  *** 
 
1.6322  *** 
   
(0.2079) 
  
(0.3318) 
 
 
Enrolled Full-Time in School 0.4756     
 
-1.2920  *** 
   
(0.2849) 
  
(0.4241) 
 
 
Non-labor Income -0.0500  *** 
 
0.0481     
   
(0.0148) 
  
(0.0342) 
 
 
Gift Income 0.0007     
 
0.0009     
   
(0.0012) 
  
(0.0028) 
 Household Characteristics: 
     
 
Married -0.5404  *** 
 
1.4340  *** 
   
(0.1550) 
  
(0.2607) 
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# of Children Age 0-4 0.4879  *** 
 
5.2701  *** 
   
(0.0870) 
  
(0.1705) 
 
 
# of Children Age 5-9 0.4987  *** 
 
3.2957  *** 
   
(0.0913) 
  
(0.1696) 
 
 
# of Children Age 10-14 0.3684  *** 
 
2.3228  *** 
   
(0.0885) 
  
(0.1662) 
 
 
# of Other Dependents 0.0332     
 
1.3099  *** 
   
(0.1032) 
  
(0.1888) 
 
 
# of Other Adults 0.0145     
 
0.8970  *** 
   
(0.1221) 
  
(0.2503) 
 
 
Have a Disabled Child 0.2810     
 
0.0547     
   
(0.2444) 
  
(0.4405) 
 
 
Have another Disabled Resident 0.2977     
 
0.2698     
   
(0.2587) 
  
(0.4874) 
 
 
Urbanicity:  Base Case Rural 
     
  
Lives in a Major City 0.7298  * 
 
-1.2493  * 
   
(0.3302) 
  
(0.6226) 
 
  
Lives in another Urban Area 1.3785  *** 
 
0.0947     
   
(0.4012) 
  
(0.7149) 
 
 
Housing:  Base Case Apartment 
     
  
Live in a House -0.1432     
 
1.0042  *** 
   
(0.1888) 
  
(0.3194) 
 
  
Live in a Townhouse 0.0644     
 
0.0356     
   
(0.2305) 
  
(0.3925) 
 
 
Moved in last year 0.0651     
 
-0.4171  * 
   
(0.1084) 
  
(0.1878) 
 
        Number of Observations 31,929 
  
31,929 
 R-Squared 0.0375 
  
0.1788 
 F-Statistic 6.07 
  
35.09 
 P-Value 
 
0.0000 
  
0.0000 
 
        All specifications also include year and state dummies, as well as state/urbanicity interactions. 
Standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for 5180 couple clusters. 
Asterisks indicate significance using a 2-tailed test against a null of zero:  *** 0.5%, ** 1%, * 5%.  
 
The estimated parameters from our baseline model of the time spent on housework are clearly 
jointly significant (p-value of 0.0000 for both men and women), but the model explains a larger 
fraction of the variation in women’s housework time (r-squared=0.18) as compared to men’s (r-
squared=0.04). His age is significantly positively associated with his and her housework time, 
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disabled men report spending almost an hour longer on housework, and men with more non-labor 
income report spending less time on housework. His characteristics have little association otherwise 
with housework time. Her characteristics, by contrast, are more strongly associated with housework 
time. When she is more educated, he spends more time and she spends less time on housework. 
Older women report more time on housework, while their partners report less. When women are 
disabled, both they and their partners report more time on housework. When women report 
receiving more non-labor income, their partners report spending less time on housework. Household 
characteristics also have a significant association with housework time. Married men report 
spending on average 30 minutes less per week while their partners report spending about 85 
minutes more per week than those in cohabiting relationships. The presence of children of all ages 
significantly increases the housework time of both men and women, though the magnitude of the 
effect is six to ten times greater for women.  
Second-stage estimation results 
We now position the models of his and her housework time shown in Table 3 above as the first stage 
in a two-stage procedure, where in the second stage we predict his and her assessment of 
housework share fairness and then three dimensions of satisfaction, based on estimation results 
from the first stage. Our key independent variables in the second-stage models, all of which include 
gender- and couple-specific fixed effects in order to control for unobservable differences across 
households in average share fairness responses or satisfaction levels, are the residuals and in some 
cases also the predicted portions of his and her housework time, as constructed from the output of 
the first-stage regressions shown in Table 3. The average of predicted housework time is, of course, 
equal to the average of actual housework time (6.2 hours for him and 17.2 hours for her); the 
standard deviations of predicted housework time are 1.1 hours for men and 5.0 hours for women. 
Residual housework time necessarily has a mean of zero. Its standard deviation is 10.6 hours for 
women and 5.8 hours for men. To ease interpretations, we normalize the fairness and satisfaction 
measures, the residuals, and the predicted housework times to have standard deviations of one so 
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that coefficients can be interpreted as the impact that a one-standard-deviation increase has on 
fairness/satisfaction responses, measured in standard deviations of within-person-couple 
fairness/satisfaction responses.    
Fairness 
Table 4 shows the results of our second-stage models predicting each partner’s perception of the 
fairness with which household tasks are allocated, using the baseline variant of our first-stage model 
(results shown in Table 3) to generate the “predicted” and “residual” portions of housework time. 
Three specifications are reported:  all include the residual portion of own and partner’s housework 
time, the second also includes each partner’s predicted housework time, and the third includes all 
the covariates incorporated in the first-stage model of housework time. A positive estimated 
coefficient for a regressor in these models indicates a positive conditional association of that 
variable with the sense that one is doing less than one’s fair share of housework. All standard errors 
are fully bootstrapped across the entire two-step estimation procedure. 
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Table 4 
Housework Share Fairness 
OLS HW & FE Share Fairness 
           
           
  
Residuals Predicted 
 His Results His 
 
Her 
 
His 
 
Her 
 
Covariates 
 
Do you do your fair share around the house?  
  
  
-0.2174  *** 0.0699  *** 
    
No 
  
(0.0119) 
 
(0.0091) 
      
  
-0.2164  *** 0.0704  *** 0.0176     0.0220     No 
  
(0.0118) 
 
(0.0091) 
 
(0.0150) 
 
(0.0147) 
  
  
-0.2179  *** 0.0695  *** 
    
Yes 
  
(0.0060) 
 
(0.0046) 
      
           Her Results 
         
 
Do you do your fair share around the house?  
  
  
0.1225  *** -0.1327  *** 
    
No 
  
(0.0109) 
 
(0.0098) 
      
  
0.1212  *** -0.1381  *** 0.0479  *** -0.2562  *** No 
  
(0.0108) 
 
(0.0097) 
 
(0.0160) 
 
(0.0141) 
  
  
0.1192  *** -0.1371  *** 
    
Yes 
  
(0.0108) 
 
(0.0097) 
      
           The covariates include year and state dummies, all the covariates reported in Table 1, and 
state/urbanicity interactions. 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
Asterisks indicate significance using a 2-tailed test against a null of zero:  *** 0.5%, ** 1%, * 5%.  
 
The results from these models are remarkably robust in sign, significance, and magnitude across all 
specifications in a manner that strongly supports our interpretation of the residuals as indicative of 
departures from the social norm. Given that these second-stage regressions include fixed effects, 
our estimates indicate that people of both genders whose residual housework time increases are 
predicted to report feeling as though they are doing a greater share of housework. Similarly, both 
men and women whose partners’ residuals increase are predicted to report feeling as though they 
are doing a smaller share of housework. Men appear particularly sensitive to their own residual 
housework time, as a one-standard-deviation increase in their residual (small as it is) leads to a 0.22 
standard deviation decrease in their share fairness report. Men are not nearly as sensitive to their 
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partner’s residual housework time, as a one-standard-deviation increase in that residual leads to 
only a 0.07 standard deviation change in their share fairness report. Women, by contrast, are about 
equally sensitive to their own and their partner’s deviations from the norm, and their level of 
sensitivity falls in the mid-range, with a one standard deviation change in either residual shifting 
their share fairness report by between 0.12 and 0.14 standard deviations. Furthermore, men’s sense 
of housework share fairness is not significantly related to the predictable part of either his or his 
partner’s housework time, whereas women’s is. This indicates that women are more likely than men 
to respond to the fairness question in an unconditional sense, rather than conditional on 
characteristics included in the first stage (such as the presence of children) that relate to how much 
housework is done by each person.  
Results from the specifications including residual and predicted values from our alternative first-
stage housework models are reported in Appendix B. Residual housework time shows the same 
relation to reports of housework share fairness observed in Table 4, though the magnitude of the 
effect is about 30 percent smaller when controlling for person-couple-specific fixed effects. Perhaps 
not surprisingly, the results from the first-stage specification predicting her share of the couple’s 
housework time, rather than his or her hours of housework time, provides a better fit in the second-
stage model of share fairness. As expected, when her residual share increases, he perceives that he 
is doing a lesser share of housework, while she perceives she is doing a greater share.  
Satisfaction 
Table 5 shows analogous results using each of our three measures of satisfaction, rather than share 
fairness, as the dependent variable in the second stage. These results indicate no strong association 
of own or partner’s residual housework time with men’s satisfaction with the division of housework 
time, with their relationship with partner, or with life. Thus, while men appear to recognize 
deviations from social norms with respect to housework when asked to assess the fairness of their 
share of housework, these deviations do not appear to influence significantly their satisfaction - 
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even the dimension of satisfaction related to how housework is divided. For women, this is not the 
case. Women’s residual housework time is significantly negatively associated, while their partner’s 
residual housework time is significantly positively associated, with women’s satisfaction with the 
division of housework. The magnitude of these effects is modest:  a one-standard-deviation change 
in either residual shifts satisfaction by between 0.04 and 0.07 of a standard deviation. These residual 
housework measures are not significantly associated with women’s satisfaction with their 
relationship with partner, but the residual portion of partner’s housework time is negatively and 
significantly associated, and her residual portion is weakly positively associated, with her satisfaction 
with life. Hence, when their men do more than is expected according to our first-stage housework 
models, women are more satisfied with regard to the intra-household division of household tasks, 
but they are less satisfied with their lives overall.  
Table 5 
Satisfaction as a Function of Housework Time 
OLS HW & FE Satisfaction 
           
           
  
Residuals Predicted 
 His Results His 
 
Her 
 
His 
 
Her 
 
Covariates 
 
Satisfaction with the Division of Housework Time (a) 
  
  
-0.0038     0.0016     
    
No 
  
(0.0107) 
 
(0.0100) 
      
  
-0.0055     0.0015     -0.0431  * -0.0056     No 
  
(0.0108) 
 
(0.0100) 
 
(0.0193) 
 
(0.0145) 
  
  
-0.0027     0.0020     
    
Yes 
  
(0.0108) 
 
(0.0100) 
      
 
Satisfaction with Relationship with Partner 
    
  
-0.0082     0.0204     
    
No 
  
(0.0087) 
 
(0.0113) 
      
  
-0.0163     0.0185     -0.1737  *** -0.0587  ** No 
  
(0.0088) 
 
(0.0111) 
 
(0.0202) 
 
(0.0216) 
  
  
-0.0084     0.0201     
    
Yes 
  
(0.0089) 
 
(0.0107) 
      
 
Satisfaction with Life  
    
  
0.0059     0.0119     
    
No 
  
(0.0099) 
 
(0.0098) 
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-0.0001     0.0115     -0.1464  *** 0.0056     No 
  
(0.0098) 
 
(0.0097) 
 
(0.0157) 
 
(0.0159) 
  
  
0.0012     0.0119     
    
Yes 
  
(0.0101) 
 
(0.0098) 
      
           
           
  
Residuals Predicted 
 Her 
Results His 
 
Her 
 
His 
 
Her 
 
Covariates 
 
Satisfaction with the Division of Housework Time (a) 
  
  
0.0654  *** -0.0426  *** 
    
No 
  
(0.0115) 
 
(0.0098) 
      
  
0.0639  *** -0.0445  *** -0.0469  * -0.0873  *** No 
  
(0.0113) 
 
(0.0098) 
 
(0.0196) 
 
(0.0173) 
  
  
0.0646  *** -0.0452  *** 
    
Yes 
  
(0.0115) 
 
(0.0099) 
      
 
Satisfaction with Relationship with Partner 
    
  
0.0024     -0.0045     
    
No 
  
(0.0093) 
 
(0.0093) 
      
  
-0.0072     -0.0068     -0.2072  *** -0.0751  *** No 
  
(0.0092) 
 
(0.0093) 
 
(0.0237) 
 
(0.0229) 
  
  
0.0013     -0.0048     
    
Yes 
  
(0.0090) 
 
(0.0089) 
      
 
Satisfaction with Life  
    
  
-0.0223  * 0.0200  * 
    
No 
  
(0.0099) 
 
(0.0095) 
      
  
-0.0288  *** 0.0192  * -0.1515  *** -0.0128     No 
  
(0.0098) 
 
(0.0094) 
 
(0.0187) 
 
(0.0130) 
  
  
-0.0276  ** 0.0172     
    
Yes 
  
(0.0099) 
 
(0.0094) 
      
           (a) These results are based on a smaller sample of 4240 couples and 22,322 observations. All 
other estimates are based on the sample of 31,929 observations and 5180 couples used to 
model housework time.  
The covariates include year and state dummies, all the covariates reported in Table 1, and 
state/urbanicity interactions. 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
Asterisks indicate significance using a 2-tailed test against a null of zero:  *** 0.5%, ** 1%, * 5%.  
 
Both men and women are also significantly less satisfied in all dimensions represented here when he 
is predicted to spend more time on housework. Her predicted housework time also negatively 
influences some dimensions of both partners’ satisfaction, though the effects are less robust and 
weaker than for men. These results suggest that gendered housework norms (cf. Candace West and 
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Don Zimmerman 1987) are important, such that both men and women lose utility when men in 
particular are expected by society to do more housework. However, the scattered negative effects 
on his and her satisfaction of women’s predicted housework time suggests couples may be happier 
when each partner is expected to do less housework. Such an effect could reflect a social norm 
according to which spending more time on housework indicates lower social status, or it could 
simply reflect the added stresses imposed by busy schedules.  
Comparable results obtained using the estimates from our alternative first-stage housework models 
are reported in Appendix C for the second-stage specification including both residual and predicted 
values. For men the results are very similar: neither his nor her residual housework time has a 
significant effect on any measure of satisfaction. Her residual share of couple housework time is 
positively but weakly (in terms of magnitude and significance) related to his satisfaction with his 
relationship with partner. These results are consistent with our findings above that men’s 
satisfaction appears to be largely unresponsive to residual housework time measures.  
Her results when adding controls for employment status in the models of housework time are also 
broadly the same. She is less satisfied with the division of housework time when she does more 
housework than expected and more satisfied when he does more than expected. However, she is 
less satisfied with life overall when his residual housework time is larger. When housework time is 
modelled with individual-couple-specific fixed effects, she is sensitive to his residual housework time 
when evaluating her satisfaction with her partner relationship and with life overall, but not when 
evaluating her satisfaction with the division of housework. When her residual share of the couple’s 
housework is higher (and hence when his residual share is lower), she is less satisfied with the 
division of housework time; she is also more satisfied with life overall. These results are in broad 
accordance with our main findings and interpretations. 
Sensitivity tests 
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We here document the numerous sensitivity tests we have run to assess the robustness of these 
results. First, we estimated the two-stage procedure using only dual-earner couples – i.e., couples in 
which each partner was always employed whenever observed in the sample. Second, we tested 
whether positive and negative deviations from the norms estimated in the first stage had symmetric 
effects on satisfaction. Third, we explored the possibility that social norms might be determined 
differently for different populations, checking for differences by running separate first-stage 
regressions by immigrant status, by education level, and by age cohort. Finally, we ran some tests for 
the possibility that reverse causality is driving our very robust results. 
Time spent on housework is, of course, jointly determined with time spent in paid employment. As 
noted by the time availability theory posited in sociology research (e.g., R.O. Blood and D.M. Wolfe 
1960), more time spent on paid employment likely means less time available for housework. 
Available time is likely to be particularly constrained in dual-earner households. To see if our results 
also hold when we only consider such households, we restricted the sample to the 2188 couples 
(11,881 observations) who when observed were always both employed, and re-estimated both the 
first and the second stage models (full results available upon request). The relation between residual 
housework time and perceived share fairness for these dual-earner couples remains highly 
statistically significant, though the magnitude of the effect of his residual in terms of standard 
deviations from the mean is about 25 percent smaller from his perspective, and 40 percent smaller 
from hers. As before, his satisfaction with the division of household time is not sensitive to any 
residual, while compared to our full-sample results, hers is a bit more sensitive to her residual and 
less sensitive to his. As regards satisfaction in other dimensions, the key difference for dual-earner 
couples is that her satisfaction with life is not significantly related to either his or her residual 
housework time. This result may arise because working women are less focused than non-working 
women on home life when it comes to evaluating their overall life satisfaction.  
To test whether the effects on fairness perceptions and satisfaction of deviations from the 
housework norm are symmetric for positive and negative deviations, we estimated our second-stage 
 
 
23 
models including separate measures of positive and negative standardized residuals from the 
baseline first-stage model of housework time. In the analysis of share fairness and of satisfaction 
with the division of household tasks, we find that negative residuals have a much larger effect than 
positive residuals. In predicting share fairness, negative residuals have over four times the effect of 
positive residuals for him, and between two and six times the effect of positive residuals for her. In 
predicting satisfaction with the division of housework time, no effect of either type of residual is 
seen for men, but women’s satisfaction is affected between two and five times more strongly by 
negative as compared to positive residual housework time. Thus, perceptions of housework share 
fairness and (for women) satisfaction with the allocation of housework are much more sensitive to 
deviations below than to deviations above the social norm – a result reminiscent of findings in the 
behavioral economics literature that individuals are more sensitive to disadvantages than to 
advantages (see Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman 1991). We also find that when he spends less 
time on housework than is the social norm he is significantly more satisfied with his partner, but 
otherwise deviations in either direction have no significant effect. She reports being somewhat more 
satisfied with her partner when he does less housework than is the norm and less satisfied with life 
when he does more housework than is the norm – results in line with our findings that in terms of 
broader measures of satisfaction, she prefers her partner to do less housework.  
To check for the possibility that the group whose social norm most informs a particular individual’s 
expectations in regard to housework time allocation is that group most like him or herself, we re-ran 
the analysis separately for couples with and without an immigrant background, for younger and 
older (both born before 1965) cohorts, and for less and more educated couples (where a “less-
educated couple” is one in which the woman has no more than twelve years of education and the 
man has no more than a vocational degree). Both the first- and second-stage models were estimated 
sequentially on these subsamples. In all cases, F-tests on the housework time models reject pooling 
– not a surprising result, given our sample size (results available upon request). However, as the 
second-stage analysis incorporates fixed effects, it is only the within-couple deviations from the 
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residual and predicted values that influence our final results, and these differences are likely to be 
less pronounced than differences in housework time across the couple types.  
Table 6 presents the results for each of these subsamples of the second-stage model of the 
perceived fairness of the housework allocation, using the specification that includes both residual 
and predicted housework time. As compared to the full-sample results, there is little difference in 
the estimated relation between residual housework and perceived share fairness in terms of either 
statistical significance or magnitude. Younger men, and to a lesser extent more educated men, 
appear to be more sensitive to her predicted housework time, being significantly more likely to 
report doing less than their fair share when her predicted time is high. Older men are, on the 
contrary, somewhat more likely to report doing more than their fair share when her predicted time 
is high. Otherwise, as in the full-sample results, predicted housework time is not significantly related 
to his sense of fairness. While overall women whose partners are predicted to spend more time on 
housework are more likely to report doing less than their fair share around the house, it is women in 
the older cohort who are particularly sensitive. This result suggests that expectations regarding what 
is fair may be evolving over time/across generations, such that housework is becoming a less 
gendered activity. 
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Table 6 
Fairness of Housework 
OLS HW & FE Satisfaction:  Heterogeneity Check 
                   His Results:  Do you do your fair share around the house?  
 
Residuals Predicted 
 
Residuals Predicted 
 
His 
 
Her 
 
His 
 
Her 
  
His 
 
Her 
 
His 
 
Her 
 
  
Non-Immigrant (I = 3436; N = 21,714) 
 
Immigrant (I = 1744; N = 10,215) 
  
-0.2132  *** 0.0736  *** 0.0011     0.0242     
 
-0.2196  *** 0.0646  *** 0.0196     0.0296     
  
(0.0139) 
 
(0.0117) 
 
(0.0199) 
 
(0.0164) 
  
(0.0214) 
 
(0.0161) 
 
(0.0310) 
 
(0.0271) 
 
  
Younger (I = 3190; N = 18,771) 
 
Older (I = 1990; N = 13,158) 
  
-0.2098  *** 0.0729  *** -0.0116     0.0714  *** 
 
-0.2251  *** 0.0600  *** 0.0328     -0.0697  * 
  
(0.0155) 
 
(0.0112) 
 
(0.0226) 
 
(0.0174) 
  
(0.0165) 
 
(0.0148) 
 
(0.0266) 
 
(0.0282) 
 
  
Less Educated (I = 2090; N = 12,883) 
 
More Educated (I = 3090; N = 19,046) 
  
-0.2010  *** 0.0772  *** -0.0185     0.0083     
 
-0.2249  *** 0.0643  *** 0.0057     0.0394  * 
  
(0.0179) 
 
(0.0157) 
 
(0.0187) 
 
(0.0250) 
  
(0.0132) 
 
(0.0102) 
 
(0.0205) 
 
(0.0176) 
 
                   
Her Results:  Do you do your fair share around the house? 
       
 
Residuals Predicted 
 
Residuals Predicted 
 
His 
 
Her 
 
His 
 
Her 
  
His 
 
Her 
 
His 
 
Her 
 
  
Non-Immigrant (I = 3436; N = 21,714) 
 
Immigrant (I = 1744; N = 10,215) 
  
0.1264  *** -0.1366  *** 0.0363  * -0.2633  *** 
 
0.1104  *** -0.1407  *** 0.0587  * -0.2272  *** 
  
(0.0128) 
 
(0.0120) 
 
(0.0178) 
 
(0.0175) 
  
(0.0161) 
 
(0.0159) 
 
(0.0283) 
 
(0.0291) 
 
  
Younger (I = 3190; N = 18,771) 
 
Older (I = 1990; N = 13,158) 
  
0.1314  *** -0.1459  *** -0.0246     -0.2412  *** 
 
0.1011  *** -0.1225  *** 0.1665  *** -0.2324  *** 
  
(0.0137) 
 
(0.0109) 
 
(0.0247) 
 
(0.0199) 
  
(0.0171) 
 
(0.0158) 
 
(0.0293) 
 
(0.0270) 
 
  
Less Educated (I = 2090; N = 12,883) 
 
More Educated (I = 3090; N = 19,046) 
  
0.1292  *** -0.1439  *** 0.0312     -0.2438  *** 
 
0.1146  *** -0.1329  *** 0.0548  ** -0.2524  *** 
  
(0.0171) 
 
(0.0173) 
 
(0.0206) 
 
(0.0221) 
  
(0.0141) 
 
(0.0112) 
 
(0.0198) 
 
(0.0184) 
                    I = the number of couples. N = the number of observations. 
The covariates include year and state dummies, state/urbanicity interactions, and all the covariates reported in Table 1. 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
Asterisks indicate significance using a 2-tailed test:  *** 0.5%, ** 1%, * 5%.  
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Table 7 presents second-stage results for the broader satisfaction measures using these different 
subsamples of the population. These results are broadly consistent with the full-sample estimates. In 
particular, men’s satisfaction with the division of housework time remains insensitive to both 
residual and predicted housework measures, while women’s remains sensitive for all samples. 
However, younger individuals appear to be more likely to report lower satisfaction with their 
relationship than older individuals when either partner is predicted to spend more time on 
housework, and lower satisfaction with life when the man is predicted to spend more time on 
housework. These results may indicate that any signals of lesser social station embodied in higher 
predicted housework time, particularly for men, are felt more keenly by younger people. 
Meanwhile, her predicted housework time is positively associated with his satisfaction with the 
relationship when he is less educated, but negatively associated with that same dimension of his 
satisfaction when he is more educated. This contrasting pattern by education level also holds for 
women’s own satisfaction with their relationship with their partner. These results are consistent 
with an impact of education on norms related to housework that then drive couples’ relationship 
satisfaction, with more-educated people preferring (in terms of relationship satisfaction) the woman 
to be in a position in which less housework is expected, and less-educated people preferring the 
opposite.10  Importantly for our story, however, the comparisons implicit in the estimated effects of 
residual housework on broader measures of her satisfaction – whereby she is less satisfied with life 
overall when he does more housework than expected, and more satisfied when she herself does 
more housework than expected – hold across most sub-samples we analyze, though with varying 
degrees of statistical significance.   
                                                           
10 This story is consistent with the findings in Foster and Stratton (2017) that document different gendered 
norms by education when it comes to housework responsibilities.  
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Table 7 
Satisfaction as a Function of Housework Time 
OLS HW & FE Satisfaction:  Heterogeneity Check 
                   
  
Residuals Predicted 
 
Residuals Predicted 
His Results His 
 
Her 
 
His 
 
Her 
  
His 
 
Her 
 
His 
 
Her 
 
  
Non-Immigrant (I = 3436; N = 21,714) 
 
Immigrant (I = 1744; N = 10,215) 
 
Satisfaction with the Division of Housework Time (a) 
           
  
-0.0015     0.0050     -0.0419     -0.0107     
 
-0.0127     -0.0047     -0.0577     -0.0103     
  
(0.0111) 
 
(0.0121) 
 
(0.0242) 
 
(0.0171) 
  
(0.0216) 
 
(0.0182) 
 
(0.0321) 
 
(0.0270) 
 
 
Satisfaction with Relationship with Partner 
           
  
-0.0194     0.0172     -0.1343  *** -0.0719  *** 
 
-0.0094     0.0237     -0.1995  *** -0.0975  *** 
  
(0.0119) 
 
(0.0120) 
 
(0.0227) 
 
(0.0227) 
  
(0.0166) 
 
(0.0188) 
 
(0.0359) 
 
(0.0331) 
 
 
Satisfaction with Life  
           
  
0.0041     0.0146     -0.1624  *** -0.0094     
 
-0.0089     0.0059     -0.0913  *** 0.0196     
  
(0.0128) 
 
(0.0115) 
 
(0.0201) 
 
(0.0176) 
  
(0.0164) 
 
(0.0195) 
 
(0.0279) 
 
(0.0249) 
 
                   
  
Younger (I = 3190; N = 18,771) 
 
Older (I = 1990; N = 13,158) 
 
Satisfaction with the Division of Housework Time (b) 
           
  
-0.0124     0.0037     -0.0448     -0.0050     
 
0.0099     -0.0033     -0.0313     -0.0307     
  
(0.0133) 
 
(0.0125) 
 
(0.0309) 
 
(0.0199) 
  
(0.0164) 
 
(0.0167) 
 
(0.0311) 
 
(0.0322) 
 
 
Satisfaction with Relationship with Partner 
           
  
-0.0162     0.0374  ** -0.2184  *** -0.0828  *** 
 
-0.0149     -0.0104     -0.0713  * 0.0570     
  
(0.0115) 
 
(0.0144) 
 
(0.0365) 
 
(0.0255) 
  
(0.0135) 
 
(0.0141) 
 
(0.0281) 
 
(0.0353) 
 
 
Satisfaction with Life  
          
  
-0.0088     0.0198     -0.2134  *** 0.0245     
 
0.0135     -0.0022     -0.0556  * -0.0033     
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(0.0119) 
 
(0.0141) 
 
(0.0272) 
 
(0.0200) 
  
(0.0169) 
 
(0.0144) 
 
(0.0261) 
 
(0.0255) 
 
                   
  
Less Educated (I = 2090; N = 12,883) 
 
More Educated (I = 3090; N = 19,046) 
 
Satisfaction with the Division of Housework Time (c) 
           
  
-0.0055    -0.0032     -0.0475     0.0521     
 
-0.0045     0.0042     -0.0419     -0.0333     
  
(0.0165) 
 
(0.0156) 
 
(0.0278) 
 
(0.0266) 
  
(0.0136) 
 
(0.0120) 
 
(0.0226) 
 
(0.0201) 
 
 
Satisfaction with Relationship with Partner 
         
  
0.0002     0.0261     -0.1313  *** 0.0711  ** 
 
-0.0265  * 0.0135     -0.1724  *** -0.1409  *** 
  
(0.0159) 
 
(0.0155) 
 
(0.0286) 
 
(0.0273) 
  
(0.0117) 
 
(0.0128) 
 
(0.0257) 
 
(0.0233) 
 
 
Satisfaction with Life  
         
  
-0.0051     0.0120     -0.1301  *** 0.0327     
 
0.0032     0.0101     -0.1176  *** -0.0244     
  
(0.0146) 
 
(0.0150) 
 
(0.0241) 
 
(0.0253) 
  
(0.0144) 
 
(0.0121) 
 
(0.0214) 
 
(0.0188) 
 
                   
                   
                   
  
Residuals Predicted 
 
Residuals Predicted 
Her Results His 
 
Her 
 
His 
 
Her 
  
His 
 
Her 
 
His 
 
Her 
 
  
Non-Immigrant (I = 3436; N = 21,714) 
 
Immigrant (I = 1744; N = 10,215) 
 
Satisfaction with the Division of Housework Time (a) 
           
  
0.0564  *** -0.0423  *** -0.0526  * -0.0973  *** 
 
0.0796  *** -0.0485  *** -0.0318     -0.0673  * 
  
(0.0138) 
 
(0.0125) 
 
(0.0213) 
 
(0.0211) 
  
(0.0223) 
 
(0.0172) 
 
(0.0422) 
 
(0.0341) 
 
 
Satisfaction with Relationship with Partner 
          
  
-0.0016     -0.0035     -0.1773  *** -0.1047  *** 
 
-0.0185     -0.0122     -0.2126  *** -0.0625     
  
(0.0109) 
 
(0.0110) 
 
(0.0257) 
 
(0.0239) 
  
(0.0165) 
 
(0.0172) 
 
(0.0378) 
 
(0.0352) 
 
 
Satisfaction with Life  
            
  
-0.0300  * 0.0221     -0.1414  *** -0.0404  * 
 
-0.0276     0.0134     -0.1244  *** 0.0209     
  
(0.0125) 
 
(0.0121) 
 
(0.0232) 
 
(0.0171) 
  
(0.0165) 
 
(0.0184) 
 
(0.0295) 
 
(0.0259) 
 
                   
  
Younger (I = 3190; N = 18,771) 
 
Older (I = 1990; N = 13,158) 
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Satisfaction with the Division of Housework Time (b) 
           
  
0.0637  *** -0.0497  *** -0.0642  * -0.0911  *** 
 
0.0628  *** -0.0330  * -0.0012     -0.0655     
  
(0.0148) 
 
(0.0127) 
 
(0.0295) 
 
(0.0210) 
  
(0.0189) 
 
(0.0166) 
 
(0.0351) 
 
(0.0388) 
 
 
Satisfaction with Relationship with Partner 
          
  
-0.0119     -0.0029     -0.2430  *** -0.1277  *** 
 
0.0019     -0.0090     -0.0665  * 0.1271  *** 
  
(0.0115) 
 
(0.0128) 
 
(0.0397) 
 
(0.0248) 
  
(0.0151) 
 
(0.0154) 
 
(0.0310) 
 
(0.0344) 
 
 
Satisfaction with Life  
            
  
-0.0317  * 0.0245     -0.1808  *** -0.0199     
 
-0.0246     0.0115     -0.1006  *** -0.0035     
  
(0.0126) 
 
(0.0131) 
 
(0.0305) 
 
(0.0184) 
  
(0.0155) 
 
(0.0140) 
 
(0.0261) 
 
(0.0291) 
 
                   
  
Less Educated (I = 2090; N = 12,883) 
 
More Educated (I = 3090; N = 19,046) 
 
Satisfaction with the Division of Housework Time (c) 
           
  
0.0817  *** -0.0313     -0.0713  * -0.0308     
 
0.0511  *** -0.0537  *** -0.0185     -0.1141  *** 
  
(0.0187) 
 
(0.0171) 
 
(0.0322) 
 
(0.0296) 
  
(0.0136) 
 
(0.0134) 
 
(0.0245) 
 
(0.0225) 
 
 
Satisfaction with Relationship with Partner 
           
  
0.0117     0.0046     -0.1314  *** 0.0548     
 
-0.0203     -0.0152     -0.2067  *** -0.1575  *** 
  
(0.0159) 
 
(0.0144) 
 
(0.0291) 
 
(0.0297) 
  
(0.0117) 
 
(0.0126) 
 
(0.0275) 
 
(0.0235) 
 
 
Satisfaction with Life  
             
  
-0.0224     0.0297  * -0.1459  *** 0.0212     
 
-0.0342  ** 0.0072     -0.1251  *** -0.0353  * 
  
(0.0153) 
 
(0.0145) 
 
(0.0256) 
 
(0.0260) 
  
(0.0122) 
 
(0.0137) 
 
(0.0247) 
 
(0.0165) 
 
                   I = the number of couples. N = the number of observations. 
(a)  For the Non-Immigrant sample, I = 2866 and N = 15,385. For the Immigrant sample, I = 1374 and N = 6,937.  
(b)  For the Younger sample, I = 2826 and N = 14,437. For the Older sample, I = 1414 and N = 7,885.  
(c)  For the Less Educated sample, I = 1587 and N = 8,354. For the More Educated sample, I = 2653 and N = 13,968.  
The covariates include year and state dummies, state/urbanicity interactions, and all the covariates reported in Table 1. 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
Asterisks indicate significance using a 2-tailed test against a null of zero:  *** 0.5%, ** 1%, * 5%.  
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Finally, one might be concerned that women’s satisfaction with life is generally negatively associated 
with their partner’s residual housework time because of reverse causality in the relationship 
between the residual portion of men’s housework time and their partner’s broader satisfaction 
measures. Thus, when women become less satisfied over time, perhaps their partners respond by 
increasing their efforts in the household. It also may be that the additional stress (or whatever is 
causing the lowered satisfaction) causes the women themselves to spend more time on housework. 
To check for this possibility, we ask whether changes in women’s satisfaction from one year to the 
next are predictive in a regression model of subsequent changes in the residual portion of 
housework time. We model changes in both his and her residuals as a function of past changes in 
both his and her satisfaction measures (see Appendix D). We run specifications including only the 
difference between his and her satisfaction measures one year ago and that of two years ago, plus a 
constant. The results are similar when we add to the regression year-over-year differences in the 
additional covariates.  
Results indicate that his residual housework time rises when in the past he felt his share had fallen, 
and falls when in the past she felt her share had fallen. Her residual responds similarly though less 
significantly. Hence, couples appear to compensate through time for perceived imbalances relative 
to one another in housework share. These results further support our interpretation of these 
residuals as indicative of deviations from social norms – to which individuals seem to have an 
incentive to return. However, none of the measures of past changes in satisfaction are significantly 
associated with changes in the residuals. Reverse causality, from satisfaction to housework, does not 
appear to be a problem.  
Discussion 
We explore the way in which the time allocated to housework by oneself and one’s partner affect 
own satisfaction in a number of dimensions. Our analysis of this question exploits panel data on 
mixed-gender couples from the Australian HILDA survey. We apply a two-stage modelling approach 
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in which we view the portion of an individual’s housework time that is predictable in the first stage – 
based on a model that includes a large set of individual and household-specific time-varying 
observables as well as year/urbanicity and state effects – as a proxy for the amount of housework 
time society expects the individual in question to perform. In stage two, we predict individual 
satisfaction in a range of dimensions based on the residual and predicted portions of own and 
partner’s housework time as estimated in stage one. Under the assumption that our model of 
housework time captures social norms related to housework, predicted housework time generated 
in our first-stage model can be interpreted as ‘expected’, while residual housework time reflects 
deviations from the norm.  
We first document a strong and intuitive relationship between the residual housework time of both 
genders and the perceived fairness of the share of housework that each person reports. These 
results lend credibility to our interpretation that the residual housework measures from the first 
stage contain information about the degree to which individuals deviate from ambient expectations 
about how much housework they should do. Our subsequent analysis of satisfaction with the 
division of household tasks suggests that societal norms regarding housework time robustly 
influence women’s satisfaction in this dimension. We find that her satisfaction with the division of 
household tasks falls as either her predicted or her residual housework time rises, and rises as her 
partner’s residual housework time rises. These effects are in line with our original hypothesis that 
she would respond positively to extra help he offers around the house over and above what is 
expected of him. However, this result does not carry over to her satisfaction with her relationship 
with her partner: she is actually less satisfied with her life as a whole when her partner does more 
housework than expected. Of potentially equal interest, women’s residual housework has no 
significant effect on either housework-related or broader measures of men’s satisfaction, with this 
striking difference in sensitivity by gender perhaps due to the stronger salience of housework in 
women’s lives.  
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We experiment with different specifications for the first stage, and we also run the entire analysis 
for separate subsamples of the data. Sensitivity testing indicates that our baseline results are robust, 
with some nuances in evidence when we split our sample by education level, age cohort, and 
whether both partners are employed. We also find some evidence of heightened responses of 
satisfaction to negative housework residuals as compared to positive housework residuals. Overall, 
our results are consistent with a gender difference in the mental saliency of housework that impacts 
upon the sensitivity of individual satisfaction levels to one’s own, and one’s partner’s, allocation of 
time to housework. 
We are the first to use models of housework time to generate measures of social norms related to 
housework that are then linked to satisfaction measures. We find strong evidence that social norms 
about housework are associated with female satisfaction with intra-household housework 
allocations, but that other measures of satisfaction do not respond positively (and sometimes 
respond negatively) when men do more housework than is predicted by our first-stage models. Our 
general conclusion is that in a more general sense, women want their men to conform somewhat to 
social stereotypes in regard to time spent on housework, even if in a more immediate or narrow 
sense they are more satisfied when their partners shoulder more of the housework burden than 
society expects.  
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Appendix A 
Alternative First Stage Models 
                 
   
OLS with Employment measures 
 
FE Estimates 
 
OLS Model of 
Her Housework 
Share 
 
  
By Men 
 
By Women 
 
By Men 
 
By Women 
 His Characteristics: 
              
 
Ethnicity:  Base Case = non-aboriginal Australian 
         
  
Aboriginal 0.7758     
 
-1.1534     
       
-5.7480  * 
   
(0.5697) 
  
(1.1188) 
        
(2.3422) 
 
  
English Speaking 
Immigrant 
0.2574     
 
-0.3962     
       
-2.4263  *** 
  
(0.1964) 
  
(0.3610) 
        
(0.8146) 
 
  
Other Immigrant -0.0973     
 
0.9667  * 
       
1.5620     
   
(0.2504) 
  
(0.4745) 
        
(0.9376) 
 
 
Education:  Base Case = 12 Years 
           
  
Post-Bachelors 0.1828     
 
0.1625     
       
0.0138     
   
(0.2865) 
  
(0.5460) 
        
(1.0430) 
 
  
BA/Honors 0.0617     
 
-0.5658     
       
-0.7320     
   
(0.2843) 
  
(0.4793) 
        
(1.0233) 
 
  
Diploma 0.1768     
 
-0.4232     
       
-1.1854     
   
(0.2148) 
  
(0.3731) 
        
(0.7564) 
 
  
Certificate III/IV -0.3166     
 
-0.4867     
       
-0.7749     
   
(0.2228) 
  
(0.4207) 
        
(0.8862) 
 
  
11 Years -0.3228     
 
-0.5027     
       
-1.2096     
   
(0.2330) 
  
(0.3743) 
        
(0.8260) 
 
  
10 Years -0.2009     
 
0.0473     
       
0.5528     
   
(0.3251) 
  
(0.5462) 
        
(1.2263) 
 
  
< 10 Years -0.6363  *** 
 
-0.2878     
       
0.8775     
   
(0.2141) 
  
(0.3751) 
        
(0.8195) 
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Age 
 
0.0490  * 
 
0.0830  * 
       
-0.1650  * 
   
(0.0193) 
  
(0.0336) 
        
(0.0765) 
 
 
Birth Cohort:  Base Case Born 1960-1970 
          
  
Born before 1960 -0.6438  * 
 
-0.1421     
       
1.8243     
   
(0.2848) 
  
(0.4887) 
        
(1.0511) 
 
  
Born after 1970 -0.4487     
 
0.6135     
       
0.3603     
   
(0.2808) 
  
(0.4602) 
        
(1.0138) 
 
                 
 
Disabled -0.4134  * 
 
0.3372     
 
0.1768     
 
-0.0220     
 
-2.2768  *** 
   
(0.1957) 
  
(0.3076) 
  
(0.1502) 
  
(0.2496) 
  
(0.6961) 
 
 
Enrolled Full-Time in School 
 
-1.4211  *** 
 
1.1928  * 
 
-0.0219     
 
0.3572     
 
-0.9496     
 
(0.3740) 
  
(0.5597) 
  
(0.3061) 
  
(0.5353) 
  
(1.2335) 
 
 
Non-labor Income -0.0342  ** 
 
0.0142     
 
0.0138     
 
0.0254     
 
0.1237  ** 
   
(0.0127) 
  
(0.0223) 
  
(0.0109) 
  
(0.0274) 
  
(0.0469) 
 
 
Gift Income -0.0017     
 
-0.0008     
 
-0.0003     
 
0.0003     
 
0.0016     
   
(0.0010) 
  
(0.0022) 
  
(0.0008) 
  
(0.0019) 
  
(0.0045) 
 Her Characteristics: 
              
 
Ethnicity:  Base Case = non-aboriginal Australian 
          
  
Aboriginal 0.7881     
 
0.0179     
       
-1.2850     
   
(0.6311) 
  
(0.9575) 
        
(2.2299) 
 
  
English Speaking 
Immigrant 
0.2728     
 
-0.7689  * 
       
-0.9103     
  
(0.2391) 
  
(0.3652) 
        
(0.8902) 
 
  
Other Immigrant -0.0781     
 
0.2570     
       
0.9330     
   
(0.2505) 
  
(0.4610) 
        
(0.9307) 
 
 
Education:  Base Case = 12 Years 
          
  
Post-Bachelors 0.7608  * 
 
-0.2777     
       
-5.2051  *** 
   
(0.3571) 
  
(0.5851) 
        
(1.2085) 
 
  
BA/Honors 0.4405     
 
0.0896     
       
-3.8863  *** 
   
(0.2979) 
  
(0.4902) 
        
(1.0918) 
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Diploma 0.0784     
 
0.1619     
       
-2.1305  ** 
   
(0.2265) 
  
(0.3730) 
        
(0.8046) 
 
  
Certificate III/IV 0.1089     
 
-0.2990     
       
-0.7859     
   
(0.2422) 
  
(0.4051) 
        
(0.9212) 
 
  
11 Years -0.5766  ** 
 
0.4795     
       
2.2812  ** 
   
(0.2097) 
  
(0.3840) 
        
(0.8216) 
 
  
10 Years -0.1067     
 
-0.2556     
       
1.6224     
   
(0.2751) 
  
(0.4849) 
        
(1.1234) 
 
  
< 10 Years -0.5128  * 
 
-0.0098     
       
3.3839  *** 
   
(0.2155) 
  
(0.3752) 
        
(0.8365) 
 
                 
 
Age 
 
-0.0417  * 
 
0.1165  *** 
       
0.3533  *** 
   
(0.0200) 
  
(0.0349) 
        
(0.0796) 
 
 
Birth Cohort:  Base Case Born 1960-1970 
         
  
Born before 1960 0.2717     
 
-0.2066     
       
-0.6599     
   
(0.2916) 
  
(0.4962) 
        
(1.0748) 
 
  
Born after 1970 -0.0652     
 
0.0641     
       
0.5896     
   
(0.2840) 
  
(0.4594) 
        
(1.0254) 
 
                 
 
Disabled 0.9999  *** 
 
-0.0716     
 
-0.0430     
 
0.7881  *** 
 
-0.9733     
   
(0.1959) 
  
(0.3154) 
  
(0.1330) 
  
(0.2558) 
  
(0.6921) 
 
 
Enrolled Full-Time in School 
 
1.1368  *** 
 
-3.8251  *** 
 
0.6357  * 
 
-0.8867  * 
 
-2.5480  * 
 
(0.2760) 
  
(0.4302) 
  
(0.2496) 
  
(0.3949) 
  
(1.0133) 
 
 
Non-labor Income -0.0363  * 
 
-0.0247     
 
0.0030     
 
-0.0102     
 
0.1912  *** 
   
(0.0151) 
  
(0.0302) 
  
(0.0122) 
  
(0.0254) 
  
(0.0596) 
 
 
Gift Income 0.0010     
 
0.0011     
 
-0.0003     
 
0.0014     
 
-0.0002     
   
(0.0013) 
  
(0.0023) 
  
(0.0011) 
  
(0.0019) 
  
(0.0049) 
 Household Characteristics: 
              
 
Married -0.1982     
 
1.0079  *** 
 
-0.3541  * 
 
1.1140  *** 
 
4.0685  *** 
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(0.1469) 
  
(0.2417) 
  
(0.1630) 
  
(0.2772) 
  
(0.5749) 
 
 
# of Children Age 0-4 1.0429  *** 
 
3.1376  *** 
 
0.3219  *** 
 
5.0233  *** 
 
4.9702  *** 
   
(0.0902) 
  
(0.1715) 
  
(0.0765) 
  
(0.1737) 
  
(0.2976) 
 
 
# of Children Age 5-9 0.7351  *** 
 
2.4899  *** 
 
0.3229  *** 
 
3.0615  *** 
 
2.4622  *** 
   
(0.0869) 
  
(0.1568) 
  
(0.0885) 
  
(0.1677) 
  
(0.2986) 
 
 
# of Children Age 10-14 0.5427  *** 
 
1.8685  *** 
 
0.2210  ** 
 
2.2530  *** 
 
1.6397  *** 
   
(0.0833) 
  
(0.1539) 
  
(0.0817) 
  
(0.1627) 
  
(0.3046) 
 
 
# of Other Dependents 0.2014  * 
 
1.2462  *** 
 
0.1320     
 
1.2486  *** 
 
1.8352  *** 
   
(0.0968) 
  
(0.1741) 
  
(0.0862) 
  
(0.1645) 
  
(0.3642) 
 
 
# of Other Adults 0.0608     
 
0.9329  *** 
 
-0.0379     
 
0.7302  *** 
 
0.4237     
   
(0.1149) 
  
(0.2309) 
  
(0.0935) 
  
(0.1896) 
  
(0.4595) 
 
 
Have a Disabled Child 0.3120     
 
-0.0734     
 
-0.1128     
 
-0.1002     
 
-0.3388     
   
(0.2212) 
  
(0.4067) 
  
(0.1659) 
  
(0.3510) 
  
(0.7665) 
 
 
Have another Disabled 
Resident 
0.2438     
 
-0.0218     
 
0.0698     
 
0.5814     
 
0.0064     
 
(0.2418) 
  
(0.4710) 
  
(0.1908) 
  
(0.3530) 
  
(0.9538) 
 
 
Urbanicity:  Base Case Rural 
             
  
Lives in a Major City 0.4724     
 
-0.6736     
 
-0.0139     
 
-1.6627     
 
-4.3368  *** 
   
(0.3118) 
  
(0.5672) 
  
(0.4594) 
  
(0.9653) 
  
(1.2412) 
 
  
Lives in another Urban 
Area 
0.9293  * 
 
0.7474     
 
0.4954     
 
0.8676     
 
-3.6496  ** 
  
(0.3664) 
  
(0.6465) 
  
(0.4202) 
  
(0.9150) 
  
(1.4021) 
 
 
Housing:  Base Case Apartment 
            
  
Lives in a House 0.0586     
 
0.9424  *** 
 
0.0863     
 
0.0529     
 
3.0750  *** 
   
(0.1823) 
  
(0.2892) 
  
(0.1774) 
  
(0.3058) 
  
(0.7520) 
 
  
Lives in a Townhouse 0.0654     
 
0.2723     
 
0.0386     
 
-0.4404     
 
0.9570     
   
(0.2279) 
  
(0.3681) 
  
(0.2330) 
  
(0.3481) 
  
(0.9309) 
 
 
Moved in last year 0.0103     
 
-0.5616  *** 
 
-0.0217     
 
-0.0821     
 
-1.1422  *** 
   
(0.1053) 
  
(0.1776) 
  
(0.0839) 
  
(0.1531) 
  
(0.3934) 
 Characteristics of His Employment 
           
 
His Hours Paid Work -0.0613  *** 
 
0.0684  *** 
         
   
(0.0051) 
  
(0.0101) 
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He is not employed 1.5221  *** 
 
0.0447     
         
   
(0.4135) 
  
(0.7506) 
          
 
He works part-time 0.3452     
 
0.5436     
         
   
(0.2653) 
  
(0.4402) 
          
 
His Occupation (base case: Professional) 
          
 
    Managers -0.1969     
 
0.0723     
         
   
(0.1590) 
  
(0.2902) 
          
 
    Technical -0.2292     
 
0.1743     
         
   
(0.1960) 
  
(0.3393) 
          
 
    Personal Service 0.3878     
 
-0.0167     
         
   
(0.3032) 
  
(0.4890) 
          
 
    Clerical 0.1706     
 
-0.5645     
         
   
(0.2239) 
  
(0.3640) 
          
 
    Sales 0.1487     
 
0.3172     
         
   
(0.2618) 
  
(0.5074) 
          
 
    Operators -0.0448     
 
-0.2219     
         
   
(0.2514) 
  
(0.4280) 
          
 
    Laborers -0.0141     
 
-0.4655     
         
   
(0.2413) 
  
(0.4464) 
          
 
His Industry (base case:  Unknown) 
         
 
    Agric., Forestry, & Fishing -0.2682     
 
0.7290     
         
   
(0.3989) 
  
(0.7047) 
          
 
    Mining & Construction -0.2203     
 
0.5408     
         
   
(0.2626) 
  
(0.5464) 
          
 
    Nondurable Manufacturing -0.1804     
 
1.2006     
         
   
(0.3040) 
  
(0.6622) 
          
 
    Durable Manufacturing -0.0342     
 
0.0779     
         
   
(0.2693) 
  
(0.5583) 
          
 
    Trade -0.1281     
 
-0.1134     
         
   
(0.2655) 
  
(0.5477) 
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    Transport, Tele. & Utilities -0.0542     
 
0.3873     
         
   
(0.2887) 
  
(0.5625) 
          
 
    Finance, Insu., Real Estate -0.0819     
 
0.4143     
         
   
(0.3287) 
  
(0.6419) 
          
 
    Business Services -0.2097     
 
0.4450     
         
   
(0.2670) 
  
(0.5403) 
          
 
    Public Admin (inc. defense) 0.1534     
 
0.7382     
         
   
(0.3093) 
  
(0.5949) 
          
 
    Education -0.4105     
 
0.1755     
         
   
(0.3344) 
  
(0.6608) 
          
 
    Health 0.0420     
 
0.0750     
         
   
(0.3826) 
  
(0.6808) 
          
 
    Service (inc. restaurants &   
    hotels) 
0.5577     
 
-0.0981     
         
 
(0.3410) 
  
(0.6318) 
          
                 Characteristics of Her Employment 
              
 
Her Hours Paid Work 0.0636  *** 
 
-0.1500  *** 
         
   
(0.0075) 
  
(0.0117) 
          
 
She is not employed 0.4228     
 
3.2280  *** 
         
   
(0.4194) 
  
(0.7061) 
          
 
She works part-time 0.1046     
 
1.0032  *** 
         
   
(0.1908) 
  
(0.3087) 
          
 
Her Occupation (base case: Professional) 
           
 
    Managers -0.2214     
 
0.0737     
         
   
(0.2071) 
  
(0.3083) 
          
 
    Technical & Operators 0.3253     
 
0.7061     
         
   
(0.2653) 
  
(0.4896) 
          
 
    Personal Service -0.0268     
 
0.7644  * 
         
   
(0.2217) 
  
(0.3760) 
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    Clerical -0.0781     
 
0.0186     
         
   
(0.1859) 
  
(0.3086) 
          
 
    Sales -0.0960     
 
-0.1877     
         
   
(0.2523) 
  
(0.4450) 
          
 
    Laborers 0.1380     
 
1.3347  ** 
         
   
(0.3446) 
  
(0.5116) 
          
 
Her Industry (base case:  Unknown) 
          
 
    Agric., Forestry, & Fishing -0.2417     
 
3.2622  *** 
         
   
(0.5629) 
  
(0.8862) 
          
 
    Mining & Construction -0.1195     
 
1.7049  * 
         
   
(0.4002) 
  
(0.8193) 
          
 
    Nondurable Manufacturing 0.0146     
 
0.1271     
         
   
(0.4426) 
  
(0.6781) 
          
 
    Durable Manufacturing 0.0154     
 
1.5601  * 
         
   
(0.4897) 
  
(0.7863) 
          
 
    Trade 0.1341     
 
1.3223  * 
         
   
(0.2999) 
  
(0.5378) 
          
 
    Transport, Tele. & Utilities 0.2769     
 
0.6970     
         
   
(0.3836) 
  
(0.6488) 
          
 
    Finance, Insu., Real Estate 0.5521     
 
-0.5958     
         
   
(0.3634) 
  
(0.6008) 
          
 
    Business Services 0.3142     
 
0.8512     
         
   
(0.3032) 
  
(0.5174) 
          
 
    Public Admin (inc. defense) 0.5162     
 
0.3434     
         
   
(0.3553) 
  
(0.5909) 
          
 
    Education 0.1365     
 
0.2146     
         
   
(0.3105) 
  
(0.5469) 
          
 
    Health 0.3974     
 
0.0757     
         
   
(0.2799) 
  
(0.5038) 
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    Service (inc. restaurants &  
    hotels) 
0.2601     
 
0.0098     
         
 
(0.3135) 
  
(0.5560) 
          
                 Number of Observations 31,929 
  
31,929 
  
31,929 
  
31,929 
  
31,929 
 R-Squared 0.1101 
  
0.2594 
        
0.0963 
 F-Statistic 12.29 
  
38.01 
  
3.94 
  
22.03 
  
16.91 
 P-Value 
 
0.0000 
  
0.0000 
  
0.0000 
  
0.0000 
  
0.0000 
 
                 All specifications also include year and state dummies, as well as state/urbanicity interactions. 
Standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for 5180 couple clusters. 
Asterisks indicate significance using a 2-tailed test against a null of zero:  *** 0.5%, ** 1%, * 5%.   
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Appendix B 
Housework Share Fairness 
Alternative Housework Models, FE Share Fairness 
              
              
  
Residuals Predicted 
 His 
 
Her 
 
Her 
Share 
 
His 
 
Her 
 
Her 
Share 
 His Results         
OLS Housework with employment measures 
       
  
-0.1962  *** 0.0549  *** 
  
-0.1095  *** 0.0853  *** 
  
  
(0.0117) 
 
(0.0089) 
   
(0.0142) 
 
(0.0144) 
   
              FE Housework 
       
  
-0.1488  *** 0.0491  *** 
  
0.0170     0.0105     
  
  
(0.0081) 
 
(0.0063) 
   
(0.0090) 
 
(0.0074) 
   
              Her Share of Housework 
         
      
0.2564  *** 
    
0.0352  * 
      
(0.0121) 
     
(0.0167) 
 
              Her Results          
   OLS Housework with employment measures 
       
  
0.1053  *** -0.1300  *** 
  
0.0464  *** -0.2204  *** 
  
  
(0.0109) 
 
(0.0094) 
   
(0.0134) 
 
(0.0155) 
   
              FE Housework 
       
  
0.0809  *** -0.0963  *** 
  
0.0371  *** -0.1248  *** 
  
  
(0.0073) 
 
(0.0068) 
   
(0.0081) 
 
(0.0073) 
   
              Share of Housework 
         
      
-0.2287  *** 
    
-0.2699  *** 
      
(0.0108) 
     
(0.0162) 
 
              The dependent variable is the answer to the question: “Do you do your fair share around the house?”.   
The covariates include year and state dummies, state and urbanicity interactions, and all the specification-specific 
covariates reported in Appendix Table A.  
Standard errors in parentheses.   
Asterisks indicate significance using a 2-tailed test against a null of zero:  *** 0.5%, ** 1%, * 5%.   
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Appendix C 
Satisfaction as a Function of Housework Time 
Alternative Housework Models, FE Satisfaction 
              
              
  
Residuals 
  
Predicted 
  
His Results His 
 
Her 
 
Her 
Share 
 
His 
 
Her 
 
Her 
Share 
 OLS Housework with employment measures 
      
 
Satisfaction with the Division of Housework Time (a) 
    
  
-0.0041     -0.0025     
  
-0.0185     -0.0027     
  
  
(0.0107) 
 
(0.0095) 
   
(0.0140) 
 
(0.0141) 
   
 
Satisfaction with Relationship with Partner 
     
  
-0.0097     0.0140     
  
-0.1288  *** -0.1014  *** 
  
  
(0.0086) 
 
(0.0103) 
   
(0.0158) 
 
(0.0164) 
   
 
Satisfaction with Life  
        
  
0.0046     0.0086     
  
-0.0842  *** -0.0432  *** 
  
  
(0.0100) 
 
(0.0096) 
   
(0.0128) 
 
(0.0138) 
   FE Housework 
           
 
Satisfaction with the Division of Housework Time (a) 
   
  
-0.0027     0.0019     
  
-0.0330  *** -0.0029     
  
  
(0.0074) 
 
(0.0071) 
   
(0.0086) 
 
(0.0064) 
   
 
Satisfaction with Relationship with Partner 
    
  
-0.0059     0.0142     
  
-0.1044  *** -0.0293  ** 
  
  
(0.0060) 
 
(0.0075) 
   
(0.0100) 
 
(0.0105) 
   
 
Satisfaction with Life  
       
  
0.0006     0.0085     
  
-0.0529  *** -0.0075     
  
  
(0.0068) 
 
(0.0069) 
   
(0.0086) 
 
(0.0079) 
   Her Share of Housework 
        
 
Satisfaction with the Division of Housework Time (a) 
    
      
0.0159     
    
-0.0027     
      
(0.0088) 
     
(0.0173) 
 
 
Satisfaction with Relationship with Partner 
    
      
0.0226  * 
    
-0.0505  * 
      
(0.0095) 
     
(0.0232) 
 
 
Satisfaction with Life  
    
      
-0.0013     
    
0.0194     
      
(0.0105) 
     
(0.0180) 
 
              
  
Residuals 
  
Predicted 
  
Her Results His 
 
Her 
 
Her 
Share 
 
His 
 
Her 
 
Her 
Share 
 OLS Housework with employment measures 
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Satisfaction with the Division of Housework Time (a) 
     
  
0.0624  *** -0.0535  *** 
  
-0.0155     -0.0517  
   
  
(0.0110) 
 
(0.0095) 
   
(0.0144) 
 
(0.0156) 
   
 
Satisfaction with Relationship with Partner 
   
  
0.0040     -0.0140     
  
-0.1666  *** -0.1224  *** 
  
  
(0.0088) 
 
(0.0088) 
   
(0.0157) 
 
(0.0181) 
   
 
Satisfaction with Life  
    
  
-0.0164  * 0.0042     
  
-0.1272  *** -0.0176     
  
  
(0.0093) 
 
(0.0089) 
   
(0.0146) 
 
(0.0131) 
   FE Housework 
          
 
Satisfaction with the Division of Housework Time (a) 
   
  
0.0009     -0.0034     
  
-0.1203  *** -0.0384  *** 
  
  
(0.0077) 
 
(0.0069) 
   
(0.0129) 
 
(0.0086) 
   
 
Satisfaction with Relationship with Partner 
     
  
-0.0189  *** 0.0120     
  
-0.0577  *** -0.0090     
  
  
(0.0061) 
 
(0.0063) 
   
(0.0112) 
 
(0.0121) 
   
 
Satisfaction with Life  
       
  
-0.0157  * 0.0099     
  
-0.1249  *** -0.0025     
  
  
(0.0067) 
 
(0.0066) 
   
(0.0086) 
 
(0.0064) 
   Her Share of Housework 
       
 
Satisfaction with the Division of Housework Time (a) 
   
      
-0.0940  *** 
    
-0.0831  *** 
      
(0.0132) 
     
(0.0179) 
 
 
Satisfaction with Relationship with Partner 
      
      
-0.0087     
    
-0.0650  * 
      
(0.0108) 
     
(0.0260) 
 
 
Satisfaction with Life  
     
      
0.0374  *** 
    
0.0155     
      
(0.0100) 
     
(0.0163) 
 
              (a)  Based on a sample of 22,322 observations and 4240 couples. All other estimates are based on a sample of 31,929 
observations and 5180 couples.  
The covariates include year and state dummies, state and urbanicity interactions, and all the specification-specific 
covariates reported in Appendix Table A.  
Standard errors in parentheses.  
Asterisks indicate significance using a 2-tailed test against a null of zero:  *** 0.5%, ** 1%, * 5%.  
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Appendix D 
Models of Residual Housework 
as a function of past changes in Fairness and Satisfaction 
      
      
Model 
 
Change in 
His 
Residual 
Housework 
 
Change in 
Her 
Residual 
Housework 
 
      Change in His Sense of the Fairness of His  
 
0.2553  *** -0.2365     
     Housework Share between t-1 and t-2 
 
(0.0750) 
 
(0.1324) 
 Change in Her Sense of the Fairness of Her  
 
-0.1479  * 0.2907  * 
     Housework Share between t-1 and t-2 
 
(0.0630) 
 
(0.1249) 
 
      Change in His Satisfaction with the Division of  
 
0.0307     -0.0213     
     Housework Time between t-1 and t-2 
 
(0.0327) 
 
(0.0616) 
 Change in Her Satisfaction with the Division of  
 
-0.0574     0.0153     
     Housework Time between t-1 and t-2 
 
(0.0318) 
 
(0.0590) 
 
      Change in His Satisfaction with Partner 
 
0.0362     0.0265     
     between t-1 and t-2 
 
(0.0346) 
 
(0.0713) 
 Change in Her Satisfaction with Partner 
 
-0.0151     0.0718     
     between t-1 and t-2 
 
(0.0314) 
 
(0.0666) 
 
      Change in His Satisfaction with Life 
 
0.0558     0.0626     
     between t-1 and t-2 
 
(0.0474) 
 
(0.0871) 
 Change in Her Satisfaction with Life 
 
0.0701     0.1011     
     between t-1 and t-2 
 
(0.0455) 
 
(0.0874) 
 
      All models also contain an intercept. 
     Asterisks indicate significance using a 2-tailed test against a null of zero:  *** 0.5%, ** 1%, * 5%.  
 
 
